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I. INTRODUCTION
This Critical Essay sets forth and expands upon remarks presented at
the International Law Weekend 2010 in New York, New York, which
constitutes the annual meeting of the American Branch of the International
Law Association (ABILA). The presentation juxtaposed certain ideas in
order to create a new framework of analysis in the process. This discussion
is intended to explore the possibilities of uniting two disparate areas of
international investment law, namely Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to serve a common purpose of
supporting development objectives. By interfacing these two approaches, it
may be possible to coordinate a policy agenda that supports development
objectives from an emerging country perspective rather than simply from
the standpoint of protecting a foreign investor.
* This essay summarizes and expands the remarks made by the author at the 89th Annual
Meeting of the American Branch of the International Law Association, "International Law and
Institutions: Advancing Justice, Security and Prosperity," held in New York, NY from October 21-23,
2010. The author's remarks were made as part of a panel discussion held on October 22, 2010 entitled,
"How Does International Development Law Coexist with Traditional Sovereignty over Economic
Resources and Activities?" Dr. Rumu Sarkar is a former Adjunct Law Professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center, and the Senior Legal Advisor to CALIBRE Systems, Inc., a defense consulting
firm located in Alexandria, Virginia. She is the author of INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE
OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL FINANCE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
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Further, it may be possible to set policy objectives to support
economic development in terms of the inflows of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) made possible by BITs and the FDI outflows made by SWFs. In
other words, it may be possible to create a dynamic between FDI inflows
and outflows in ways that support and further development-related goals in
the emerging country in question. Hopefully, this dynamic will help move
the emerging economy away from a potentially "vicious circle" between
inflows and outflows of FDI, and move it toward a "virtuous cycle"
between the two. While a foreign investment regime has many components
controlled by a number of different legal instruments and bilateral
agreements, for purposes of this discussion, this essay shall only consider
BITs in order to better focus on the underlying theme.
A BIT is simply an agreement between two countries, usually a
developed "home" country and a developing "host" country. BITs govern
several key aspects of both the promotion and protection of foreign
investments made in the host country by the home country.' The plethora
of BITs is overwhelming: by 2006, over 2,600 BITs had been signed with
about seventy new ones being executed each year, according to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2 In part, the
proliferation of BITs is a reaction to the absence of a multilateral instrument
that sets forth the parameters of FDI-this absence has created a vacuum.
The failed OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) proposed
and considered between 1995 and 1998 is one noteworthy example of this
failed attempt.3 This vacuum has been filled with an exponentially
increasing number of bilateral investment treaties in lieu of a single
multilateral one.
A BIT generally is composed of five basic provisions:
1) The scope of its application;
2) The conditions for the entry of new FDI;
3) The standards of treatment to be applied to foreign
investors;
4) The protections against expropriation; and
1. Alec Johnson, Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 59 EMoRY
L.J. 919,919 (2010).
2. ITUC Briefing Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://gum.c50-hosting.com/
en/topics/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreementes/bilateral-investment-treaties/background/tils-
briefing-note-on-bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
3. See OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, http-//www.oecd.org/document/
22/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819l_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
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5) Investment dispute resolution usually by means of
providing for international arbitration.4
The terms and conditions of a BIT represent a bargain between the two
contracting states insofar as the host country promises to protect the FDI
made by the home country. In exchange for the new (i.e., greenfield) or
increased FDI, the host country implicitly agrees to a diminution of its
sovereign authority by agreeing to protect the foreign investment against
state expropriation and regulatory takings, and by delegating judicial
authority to adjudicate disputes concerning the investment to international
arbitral bodies.5
This generally means that the host state, at the request of the investor,
must submit investment disputes, including the interpretation and
application of the BIT, to binding third party international arbitration.6
Further, most BITs also contain a provision that where the home state pays
compensation to one of its investors for losses covered under an investment
insurance program, the home state is subrogated to the rights of the investor
against the host state for the recovery of compensation for any losses.
Why would a developing or an emerging country agree to a diminution
in its sovereign power by entering into a BIT? The answer is both
contextual and complex but, in general, many developing countries do not
have adequate domestic income and savings levels to support their in-
country investment needs. Therefore, such countries must source their
capital needs from external sources of financing. Many lower income
developing countries are, in fact, heavily dependent on official development
assistance (from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and
bilateral donors such as the U.S., U.K., Canada, and many others). Private
investment in the form of FDI is also sought after by emerging countries in
hopes that such capital investments will bring about greater economic
growth and prosperity.8 For example, an influx of foreign capital may help
fund new technologies and physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges,
dams, telecommunications networks, airports, seaports, schools, hospitals)
as well as enlarge the existing human resource base by increasing
vocational training and by encouraging technology transfers. The FDI may
4. Johnson, supra note 1, at 928-29; see also Kenneth Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization
and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 506-07 (1998).
5. Johnson, supra note 1, at 924-25.
6. Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 508.
7. Id. at 509.
8. Johnson, supra note 1, at 927.
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also enhance capital market growth by encouraging secondary trading of
shares in local stock markets.9
Whether entering into a BIT actually increases FDI overall is a
different matter. The academic literature seems to concur that there is no
positive correlation between signing a BIT and increased FDI flows.o
"Surprisingly, many analyses exploring the economic effects of BIT signing
has generally come to the rather discouraging conclusion that BIT treaties
are not associated with large increases in foreign investment."" Indeed,
"BITs do not appear to increase foreign investment flows, or to improve the
characteristics of the local investment environment in signatory
,,12
countries.
This is somewhat ironic and perhaps even disturbing since increasing
FDI appears to be the raison d'9tre of entering into a BIT. It begs the
question of whether entering into a BIT is in the best interest of the
emerging country in question, especially at the price of relinquishing
certain sovereign rights that it may have otherwise exercised. The focus of
BITs to date has really been on the protection of foreign investor rights
rather than on the needs of the emerging country. As such, BITs tend to be
9. Deborah Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L &
POL'Y 131, 131-32 (2005).
10. Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 524.
It is unlikely that any causal connection between the conclusion of BITs and
increased foreign investment flows could ever be established using statistical
correlations. Because any impact that BITs have on investment flows may not be
immediate and because the majority of BITs are recent, insufficient time may
have elapsed to accurately measure the impact of BITs. Assuming that a
correlation between BITs and investment flows could be identified, the
correlation may be negative, since states that are having the greatest difficulty
attracting foreign investment may have the greatest incentive to conclude BITs.
Even if a positive correlation were found, there still would be serious difficulties
in demonstrating the direction of causation. First, the number of variables that
must be controlled is enormous, including presence of natural resources,
availability of inexpensive labor. status of physical infrastructure, level of
education of the work force, size of the market, proximity to other markets, and
political stability, to name a few. Second, even if one could control for [sic] all
the variable and demonstrate a statistically significant positive correlation
between the number of BITs and investment inflows, one still could not be certain
which variables were dependent and which independent.
Id. at 524-25. See also Johnson, supra note 1, at 926.
]1. Deborah L. Swenson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Integration, 4
(University of California, Preliminary Draft, 2008), available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/
faculty/dswenson/BlTslntegrationO8.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
12. Id. at 4-5.
asymmetrical and unbalanced in nature, a point that will be addressed later
in the discussion.
BITs are, however, important legal instruments in ensuring
"investment neutrality" in two ways. First, BITs ensure that investors may
establish investments in the territory of the other investor on a co-equal
basis. In other words, there are no barriers to outward or inward investment
flows, thus guaranteeing the free movement of investment capital on a
cross-border basis.13  Second, the host state is prohibited from
discriminating against investments on the basis of national origin with
regard to the ownership or control of such investments. 14 Most BITs grant
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the home state investment and
investors. In essence, therefore, BITs grant favorable treatment for foreign
investment on the basis of access, security, dispute resolution, and
transparency.' 5 While these measures are aimed at creating and preserving
investment neutrality, entering into BIT also signals something more
fundamental, as discussed below.
II. USING TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT
OBJECTIVES
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties as a Form of Economic Liberalism
Entering into a BIT tends to signal a willingness to enter into an
internationally accepted investment framework that centers on protecting
foreign investments made in the host country. While merely signing a BIT
does not necessarily mean that systemic and overarching legal and other
market reforms are forthcoming, it at least provides concrete evidence that
the host government has considered foreign investment issues and has
committed to undertake (or refrain from) certain legal actions in relation
thereto.
In fact, entering into a BIT is a "shortcut" that provides foreign access
to captive emerging markets while hedging against the risks implicit in such
markets such as the likelihood of state expropriations, regulatory takings or
"creeping expropriation," imposing export or currency controls, or having
to deal with a potentially weak, biased, inefficient or corrupt judicial
system.' 6 By providing substantive safeguards against these risks, and by
providing off-shore arbitration with respect to disputes arising from the
foreign investment, the market value of the investment is protected, at least
13. Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 510-11.
14. Id.at5ll.
15. Id. at 514.
16. Id.
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in theory, thus allowing sufficient time in which the foreign investor may
expropriate (or in the best case scenario, reinvest) any profits made from
the venture.
Thus, a BIT may be regarded as an example of a bilateral instrument
of economic liberalization where the private property and contract rights of
the foreign investor are provided special protections. The host state agrees,
in effect, to protect the foreign investment from public interference, protects
against any discrimination against the nationality of the foreign investors
thereby promoting investment neutrality, and helps to facilitate the market
by encouraging unimpeded cross-border investment flows.' 7
More importantly, however, in this context, by signing a BIT, these
legal commitments are raised to the level of international law. By agreeing
to a free-standing, clear set of rules to govern foreign investment, the host
country substitutes its own domestic laws for a set of agreed upon
independent rules that are enforceable through international arbitration
before neutral and independent intemational arbitral bodies.' 8 In other
words, this substitutes a domestic regime for what is, in effect, an
international one, thereby sidestepping weak domestic laws and inefficient
judicial institutions that may not be able to adequately protect the foreign
investment.
Two separate issues stem from the above: first, entering into a BIT
signals an initiation into a liberal economic regime where the relation of the
state to the market is predicated on certain predetermined assumptions; and
second, while BITs may be an initiation into economic liberalism,
concluding a BIT does not actually establish an economically liberal
regime.'9 While BITs may be designed to address market imperfections, it
does not address the underlying causes of such imperfections such as, the
lack of contract enforceability, weak and non-transparent financial markets,
inefficient judicial and enforcement mechanisms, and systemic corruption.
Generally speaking, many more steps may need to be taken by the host
country in order to create consistent and continued climate of economic
liberalism, and the failure to do so may ultimately render the BIT
20ineffective in the long-term.
As a self-proclaimed instrument of economic liberalism, BITs do,
indeed, tend to support the underlying philosophy of economic liberalism. 2 1
By limiting the state's power to interfere with private property and contract
17. Id. at 505-06.
18. Johnson, supra note 1, at 925.
19. Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 514.
20. Id. at 516.
21. Id. 503-04.
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rights, BITs support a basic tenant of liberal economic theory that the free
market, rather than the state, most efficiently allocates resources, and
therefore, the state's interference with free market forces should be limited
in substantive ways. Further, the contractual bargain made between private
parties should be protected by and not interfered with by the state. Finally,
economic liberalism supports the belief that the state should intervene in
prescribed ways only where required in order to correct market failures, and
should do so in a manner that facilitates rather than impedes market
forces.22
This view of state power and its limits is fully consistent with the
laissez-faire approach historically taken by most advanced nations. In fact,
this view of the state's powers and its appropriate roles may be perceived as
a view from without, that is to say, from the viewpoint of a foreign investor
from an advanced nation where this approach is implicitly understood, if
not actively supported. The views of emerging countries may not
necessarily be in full accord with approach as shall be discussed later with
respect to the underlying philosophy that may motivate SWFs.
Of course, BITs are bilateral instruments that are only a small part of a
foreign investment regime.23 Simply signing a BIT does not establish a
liberal economic regime-in order to create an enabling investment
environment, a new legal framework of domestic laws (e.g., contract, tax,
employment, environmental, intellectual property) may need to be
legislated, and domestic institutions may need to be created or strengthened
(e.g., stock markets, securities and commodities regulatory institutions,
environmental agencies, central bank, courts). Additionally, education and
public outreach measures may need to be undertaken so that the parameters
of the new regime are disseminated and understood by lawyers, judges, and
the public, including the investing public.
More importantly, however, the host country must move quickly and
efficiently to correct market distortions on its own in order to create a Rule
of Law-based economic and legal environment. Simply entering into BITs
with interested home countries will not be sufficient to achieve real
economic growth. For example, in Africa where FDI tends to be
concentrated in extractive industries, many countries are extremely
vulnerable to rises and falls in commodity prices, thus leading to extreme
fluctuations in FDI inflows and outflows. 24 If systemic problems in the
underlying economic and legal framework are not addressed by the host
22. Id. at 504-06.
23. Id. at 515.
24. Johnson, supra note 1, at 920.
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country, it may continue to be vulnerable to boom and bust cycles, thus
making sustainable economic development all the more illusory.
Entering into a BIT may be viewed as an opportunity to create a new
or revitalized investment regime by the host country. The foreign investor
should also view this opportunity as one in which to partner with the host
country in initiating systemic and sustainable change. However, there is a
broader opportunity that seems to be missing from this equation. While
BITs are ostensibly entered into by host countries in order to source new
avenues of FDI to promote economic development and encourage capital
growth, BITs are generally not explicitly tied to overall development
objectives of the host country. Of course, the host country in question must
also define its development objectives as a political prerogative-this is
something that no other country or multilateral institution can do for it.
However, because BITs and the whole discourse surrounding
them have become focused on foreign investment, they tend to
ignore important domestic considerations to the detriment of
home and host countries alike. While there exists a healthy
debate over the value of BITs to developing countries, most
studies-both by supporters who argue that BITs positively
impact FDI, and detractors, who claim that they do not-center
on foreign investment alone. . . . [It is argued] that BITs that
ignore important domestic issues forego real opportunities to
promote a host country's sustainable economic development. 25
By moving away from a foreign investor-centered debate and moving
toward a host country-centered discussion, it may be more advantageous for
both home and host countries to become true partners in development, and
create overall sustainable investment and trade opportunities into the future.
Although BITs are not now specifically designed to support host country
development objectives, BITs may be reengineered to do so in the future.
In fact, there is already evidence that a movement in this direction is
already taking place.
B. Reengineering BITs in the Future to Support Development Goals
Changing the nature of BITs and the underlying motivation for
entering into one is an uphill battle. BITs, as a positivist instrument of
economic liberalism, implicitly resist the idea of imposing government
controls, restrictions, or performance-based criteria that modifies or
interferes with free market choices. The protection of international
investments and investors will remain a paramount consideration; however,
25. Id. at 929.
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a more nuanced approach has been adopted fairly recently that changes the
parameters of BITs in significant ways. These changes may ultimately
support development objectives that could be shared by the home and the
host country alike.
Norway's former draft model BIT 26 provides an illustrative example of
a new emerging trend in more effectively balancing investor rights with
state rights to both regulate and protect human health, safety, international
labor rights, and the environment. In June 2009, Norway shelved its
consideration of a new draft model BIT proposed in December 2007, and
released for public comment on December 19, 2007. Nevertheless, certain
of its provisions dealing with corporate social responsibility, human rights,
and sustainable development are very useful in this context.27 The
Preamble reaffirmed Norway's commitment to democracy, the rule of law,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their duties
under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.2 8 It also notes the support of the signatory parties to both prevent
and fight corruption, including bribery in international trade and
investment.2 9
Article 24 of the model draft BIT (and now abandoned) states in
essence that nothing in the BIT shall prevent the Parties from adopting or
enforcing measures to protect the environment, support human rights,
control corruption, and support sustainable development generally.30 This
model BIT takes into account the needs of both developed and developing
countries, including the fair consideration of measures that protect the host
country.
Article 32 supports corporate social responsibility by specifically
encouraging Norwegian investors to "conduct their investment activities in
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to
participate in the United Nations Global Compact."3 While Norway's draft
26. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-
shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
27. Id.
28. American Society of International Law, International Law In Brief Draft Model
Norwegian Bilateral Investment Treaty (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.asil.org/
ilib080421.cfin (last visited Dec. 11,2010).
29. Id.
30. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [. . .] for the Promotion and Protection
of Investment (Draft Version 191207), art. 24, available at http://www.asil.org/ilib080421.cfin (follow
"Click here" hyperlink below Treaties, Agreements, and Related Documents) (last visited Mar. 24,
2011).
31. Id. art. 32.
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model BIT was abandoned due to stakeholder concerns voiced by Non-
Government Organizations and private businesses who felt that the model
BIT did not include sufficient protections for investors, it can be argued that
it was a step in the right direction.
Indeed, the 2004 U.S. draft model BIT demonstrates a promising new
direction. The Department of State and the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) were the lead agencies in an interagency
effort to update the U.S. model bilateral investment treaty.32 Article 10 of
the model treaty sets forth new provisions on transparency that provide, in
essence, that each party designate contact points, and that it notify the other
party of any contemplated changes that may affect the operation of the BIT,
and that it publish in advance any such measures, and provide the other
party a reasonable amount of time in which to comment on such proposed
changes.
Further, Article 12(2) provides that:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise
consistent with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental concerns.
Similarly, Article 13(1) provides that:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in
domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer
to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that
weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized
35labor rights....
While the 2004 U.S. draft model BIT may lack the breadth of the 2007
Norway model BIT, there is a strong recognition that BITs are now a two-
32. U.S. State Department Press Statement, Update of US. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
("BIT"), BILATERALS.ORG (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?articlel37 (last visited
Dec. 11, 2010).
33. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 10, 2004 Model
BIT, http://ustraderep.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset upload file847 6897.pdf
(last visited Dec. 14, 2010).
34. Id. art. 12.
35. Id. art. 13.
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way street, and that the parties' reciprocal legal obligations include being
cognizant of the environmental and social needs of the host country. Thus,
BITs can and have been reengineered to support development objectives of
the host country, and should be viewed as a dynamic and powerful bilateral
instrument in furthering those goals as mutually reinforcing obligations of
the parties.
C Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Co- Vehicle to Support a Development
Agenda
The above discussion explained how BITs constitute a part of a liberal
economic regime that essentially curtails the power of the host state to
interfere with or impede private contractual and property relations.
However, this view of the state, previously characterized as a view from
without (i.e., a view of an advanced investor nation looking at a host
country), may not be shared in principle by emerging countries. The view
from within, so to speak, may be based on a widely different set of
philosophic assumptions.
For example, restraining the power of the state in protecting the rights
of the individual may be a viewpoint that is not necessarily shared by the
host state. Instead, the state may be viewed as the fountainhead of all rights
enjoyed by individuals. In other words, a liberal economic regime may
not necessarily be the desired outcome of establishing a new investment
climate from the perspective of an emerging economy-it may simply be
the by-product of it.37
While BITs create part of the legal framework governing the inflow of
FDI into a host country, SWFs are one means by which outflows of FDI are
made by the host country.38  SWFs are a state-owned investment fund
36. For a fuller discussion of the philosophic underpinnings of emerging countries, see RUMU
SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL FINANCE
33-73 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
37. Kenneth Vandevelde states rather empathically that:
[L]iberalization may not be essential to economic development. The recent
history with planned economies and import substitutions development policies
suggests, however, that states that choose an illiberal path have encountered
enormous difficulties with economic development beyond a certain point. In
short, states seeking to develop economically may have little alternative as a
practical matter but to embrace the kinds of policies that a BIT requires.
Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 526.
38. UNCTAD reports that SWFs invested USD $10.5 billion or 27% of their total FDI in
developing countries, mainly in Asia, with limited investments in Africa and Latin America. Over the
past two decades, SWFs have invested 73% of their assets in developed countries, principally in the
form of Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) in the financial services sector of developed countries. Press
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composed of financial assets such as, stocks, bonds, real estate, or other
financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets. These assets may
include a balance of payments surpluses, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts
resulting from commodity exports.39 While emerging countries with SWFs
are a small subset of developing countries overall, they do include places
such as Nigeria, Mauritania, Trinidad & Tobago, Indonesia, Vietnam, East
Timor, and Botswana.40
SWFs often suffer from the same type of bias as BITs-they are not
seen from the perspective of the originating country but from the
perspective of advanced nations. This view is imbalanced insofar as it does
not take into account the needs and objectives of the country originating the
SWF. In some ways, BITs represent the viewpoint of advanced investor
nations looking at emerging economies whereas SWFs represent the views
of emerging countries looking at advanced nations. Perhaps both may be
viewed as two sides of the same coin.
Ian Bremmer argues provocatively that, "the free-market tide has now
receded. In its place has come state capitalism, a system in which the state
functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for
political gain."4' This may not be strictly the case since most SWFs are
generally composed of excess foreign currency reserves that are designed to
hedge against extreme volatility in foreign exchange and commodities
markets, to provide for liquidity in times of capital constraints faced by
emerging economies without having to resort to the International Monetary
Fund for immediate cash infusions, and to create a diversified portfolio of
assets for use by future generations.42
Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Sovereign Wealth Funds Beginning to
Play Major Role in Foreign Direct Investment through Mergers and Acquisitions,
UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2008/037/Rev.1 (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/
templates/webflyer.asp?docid=10478&intltemlD-4697&lang=1 (last visited on Apr. 1, 2011). For a
discussion distinguishing FDI from FPI, see Levin Institute, State University of New York, What are the
Different Kinds of Foreign Investment? (2010), http://www.globalizationl0l.org/index.phpfile=
issue&passl=subs&id=55 (last visited on Apr. 1, 2011).
39. Rumu Sarkar, Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Development Tool for ASEAN Nations: From
Social Wealth to Social Responsibility, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 621, 622 (2010).
40. Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
41. Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?, 2 (Foreign
Affairs, Essay, May/June 2009), available at http://www.panzertruppen.org/2010/economia/mh002.pdf
(last visited Dec.11, 2010).
42. Sarkar, supra note 39, at 625; see also Efram Chalamish, OECD Global Forum on
International Investment: Protectionism and Sovereign Investment Post Global Recession, 3 (Dec. 7-8,
2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/22l44231385.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2010). In
fact:
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Bremmer also states that:
A third wave of state capitalism was marked by the rise of SWFs,
which by 2005 had begun to challenge Western dominance of
global capital flows. These capital reserves were generated by
the huge increase in exports from emerging market countries. . . .
A fourth wave of state capitalism has now arrived, hastened by
the recent global economic slowdown. But this time, the
governments of the world's wealthiest countries, and not just
those of emerging-market countries, are the ones intervening in
their economies. In the United States, lawmakers have
intervened in the economy despite the public's historic mistrust
of government and its faith in private enterprise. Australia,
Japan, and other free-market heavyweights have followed suit.43
This argument may point to an implicit tension between the
philosophies underlying the market capitalism approach of BITs and the
state capitalist oriented approach of SWFs. Whereas BITs are designed to
protect foreign investors' interest, SWFs are designed to maximize foreign
investments made by emerging countries.
As Efram Chalamish explains:
It is important to note that SWFs have been criticized by their
own home states as well for being over-diversified and investing
extensively in the West, especially in Western financial
institutions. Most of these financial investments have generated
significant losses during the 2008 financial crisis to many SWFs
and, indirectly, to the governments of their home countries.
Many of these investments are perceived as outside of the core
investment strategy of most SWFs and many local conservative
voices have called for investing conservatively and mainly in the
geographical region of the respective fund."
[d]uring the financial crisis, France launched a Euro 20 billion SWF in 2009 with
the ostensible aim of protecting national strategic companies from 'foreign
predators'--the very accusation leveled at sovereign funds from Asia and the
Middle East. This is despite the fact that the objective condition for establishing a
SWF-higher current account surpluses and strong basic commodity exports-
are missing in France.
Kalvajit Singh, Fixing Global Finance: A Developing Country Perspective on Global Financial
Reforms, 47 (2010), available at http://www.madhyam.org.in/admin/tender/FGF25I0.pdf (last visited
Dec. 15, 2010).
43. Bremmer, supra note 41, at 6.
44. Chalamish, supra note 42, at 4.
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While the scope, impact, and political implications of SWFs fall
outside the scope of this critical essay, FDI flows, both inflows regulated by
BITs and outflows of FDI made vis-ai-vis SWFs may be used to support
development objectives. In other words, the FDI invested through BITs,
and the profits generated by portfolio earnings of SWFs, may both be used
to support development goals of the emerging country. This approach may
be viewed as an opportunity to create a development-based "virtuous
cycle."
Specifically, a percentage of SWF-generated profits or dividends could
be set aside to support pre-defined and well-defined development objectives
in the host country. Such public expenditures of profits could go to support
physical infrastructure in terms of roads, airports, seaports,
telecommunications, as well as social infrastructure in terms of schools,
hospitals, and social welfare programs. In other words, a small percentage
of the profits generated by SWFs may be used to dovetail with and
financially bolster FDI-supported projects in the host country. This
dynamic should both encourage the free flow of cross-border capital and
create legal conditions for investor neutrality. This mutuality of obligation
among the parties, including foreign investors, may actually help deepen
and strengthen global capital markets.
Additionally, new BITs are constantly being negotiated and executed,
and may be re-tooled along the lines discussed above to reflect the new
development-based priorities of the host country. This undertaking should,
in principle, be supported by the home country (foreign investor) with the
long-term perspective of creating better and more stable global trade and
capital markets. Thus, both BITs and SWFs may be seen as co-vehicles for
supporting the development objectives of the host country, despite their
different philosophic underpinnings. It is also a means for an emerging
country to avoid the vicious circle of "boom and bust" foreign exchange
earnings and expenditures, and move toward the "virtuous cycle" of
creating development-based opportunities and sustainable economic
growth.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, policy coordination between FDI inflows and outflows,
viewed from the perspective and needs of emerging countries, may better
support development objectives, facilitate more efficient cross-border
investment flows, and create a stronger global foreign investment regime in
the future.
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